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Abstract  
In the early 2000s, Indonesia witnessed a proliferation of Islamist paramilitary groups and terror 
activity in the wake of Suharto’s downfall. Having said this, over the years since Suharto’s 
downfall, the dire threat predictions have largely failed to materialize at least strategically. This 
outcome raises some interesting questions about the ways in which Indonesian policy-makers 
responded to the security threat posed by Islamist militancy. Drawing on Temby’s thesis about 
Darul Islam and negara Islam Indonesia and combining this with Colombijn and Lindblad’s 
concept of ‘reservoirs of violence’, the following paper establishes that persistent and excessive 
punitive action by the state is potentially counter-productive in the long run. On its own, punitive 
action fails to address effectively the conditioning factors underlying militancy and its different 
social imaginary. If over-utilized, it runs too high a risk of antagonizing and further polarizing 
oppositional segments of the population by perpetuating a ‘ghettoized’ sense of enmity and 
alienation amongst them towards the state and wider society. This paper argues that a more 
nuanced approach that both supports and utilizes various preventative measures is also critical for 
addressing complex and deeply rooted types of insecurity. By situating localized responses to the 
problem in historical context, this paper underscores the importance of charting a course between 
strategic and human security concerns to counter the specific imaginary of extreme thinking and 
limit the conditions under which Islamist militancy reproduces in Indonesia.  
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 Of Social Imaginary and Violence:  
Responding to Islamist Militancy in Indonesia  
 
 
Paul J. Carnegie 
   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Indonesian Government may not officially differentiate between any particular militant groups 
in Indonesia but over the last decade and more, its Counter Terrorism Policy (CTP) has focused 
predominantly on the threat posed by militant Islamist groups operating within the jihadist orbit. 
In fact, Indonesia’s contemporary anti-terrorism laws are largely a by-product of the 2002 Bali 
Bombings.1 To elaborate, in the early 2000s, Indonesia witnessed a proliferation of Islamist 
paramilitary groups and terror activity in the wake of Suharto’s downfall. Having said this, over 
the years since Suharto’s downfall, the dire threat predictions have largely failed to materialize at 
least strategically. This outcome raises some interesting questions about the ways in which 
Indonesian policy responds to the security threat posed by militant Islamist extremism.  
 
Despite the qualified success of Indonesian state agencies in degrading the strategic threat of 
violent extremism, taking persistent punitive action to deal with the issue of militant extremism is 
potentially counter-productive in the long run. It risks antagonizing or polarizing oppositional 
segments of the populace in such a way as to perpetuate ‘ghettoized’ senses of enmity and 
                                                          
1 On 12th October 2002 in the aftermath of the Bali Bombings, then President Megawati Soekarnoputri issued two 
PERPU (Government Regulation In-Lieu of Law -- peraturan pemerintah pengganti undang-undang) No. 1/2002 on 
the eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism and No.2/2002 on Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism in relation 
to the bombing in Bali. In April 2003, Indonesia introduced new anti-terrorism legislation (Law No 15/2003) with a 
set of wide-ranging measures designed to combat terrorist threats. These included incarceration provisions ranging 
from a minimum of three years to life sentences. It also allowed for the death penalty in extreme cases. It gave 
government agencies the authority to detain and investigate suspected terrorists for three days based on initial 
intelligence information; a maximum of seven days based on sufficient evidence; freeze suspected bank accounts; 
open and examine mail and intercept telephone and other communications of suspects for a period of sixty days at a 
time.  
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alienation towards the state and wider society. Especially amongst targeted kinship groups and 
associated communities. On the other hand, reticence on the part of authorities to tackle effectively 
the ‘grey area’ between extreme radicalism and outright violent militancy or intervene for 
whatever political reasons could blowback in unexpected ways. Strategic threats can potentially 
re-emerge without financially coordinated and genuine efforts to de-radicalize extreme groupings 
and promote tolerance. Extreme thinking has the potential to foment and metastasize and 
eventually spill over into ‘new’ forms of home-grown violent militancy if the attitudes and 
conditions that incubate intolerance and extreme thinking are left unchecked. In fact, the Jakarta 
based SETARA (2012) reported 264 attacks on religious minorities in 2012, up from 244 in 2011 
and 216 and 2010 respectively with local Ahmadiyya, Baha’i, Christian or Shi’a minorities the 
main targets.  
 
Given the range of punitive powers at the authorities’ disposal, it is also important to consider the 
ways in which localized understandings of the problem have also shaped responses in Indonesia. 
The following paper examines the extent to which Indonesia has managed to chart a course 
between strategic and human security concerns in countering extreme thinking and degrading 
militant threats. By drawing on Temby’s thesis about Darul Islam and negara Islam Indonesia and 
combining this with Colombijn and Lindblad’s concept of ‘reservoirs of violence’, the paper maps 
the contingent contours of contemporary Islamist militancy in Indonesia and the legacy of different 
‘imagined de-colonizations’. It underscores that preventative persuasion measures are also critical 
in addressing the complex and deeply rooted types of social imaginary, violence and insecurity 
that condition Islamist militancy in Indonesia.  
 
State, Imagined Communities and Militancy  
Militancy in Indonesia is not new if we take that to mean combative and aggressive action in 
support of a cause (Hartman 2013; van Dijk 1980). This is of no great surprise given the 
archipelago’s size, diversity and history (Carnegie 2012, 72-73). From the Tuanku Imam Bonjol’s 
Padri rebellion in the 19th century through to the rise of Darul Islam (DI - Abode of Islam) and 
Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII - Indonesian Islamic Army) during the long struggle against Dutch 
colonial rule, Indonesia has a complex history of radicalism, separatism and rebellion. Before 
8 
 
going further, introducing some historical context and specific analytic perspectives are useful for 
giving us a better sense of the reproductive capacity and ‘imaginings’ shaping militant group 
dynamics in Indonesia. This framing makes the seemingly sporadic, periodic and episodic qualities 
of contemporary Islamist militancy in Indonesia slightly more intelligible. In fact, the 
contemporary terrain of Indonesian militancy displays a number of significant conditioning 
developments. Historically speaking, overlapping strands of national, religious, and cultural 
identity have created some uneasy tensions in Indonesia (Carnegie 2013a, 60). While there little 
doubt of the significance of Islam as a religion in Indonesia, during both the colonial and 
postcolonial periods some contentious and ambiguous relationships and interactions formed 
between the state, international contexts and the polity’s cultural-religious identification especially 
in terms of Islam as a mobilizing force (Santoso 1996). In fact, there have been numerous attempts 
simultaneously to harness and curtail Islam’s state-level ambitions (Carnegie 2010, 83).   
 
In a broad schematic sense, we can trace a three-way split in Indonesia as a variety of ‘identity 
politics’ evolved in response to tensions created by the emergence of the modern nation-state, 
namely traditionalist, modernist and radical (van Bruinessen 2002, 125). In terms of political 
Islam, the traditionalist response gave rise to the massive Sunni Islamic socio-religious 
organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU - Awakening of Ulama) with members numbering in the tens 
of million. In the immediate post-independence era, the modernist Islamic party Masyumi (the 
Council of Muslim Organizations) was the major Islamic political party in the fledgling republic. 
Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s other main socio-religious organization still views itself as the 
custodian of Masyumi’s modernist Islamic legacy. In counterpoint to the political representative 
ambitions and social mission of traditionalist and modernist responses, a much more radical and 
militant divergence manifested itself. A divergence that is traceable to the large networks of 
revolutionary Islamic militias that formed around Darul Islam (DI - Abode of Islam) and Tentara 
Islam Indonesia (TII -Indonesian Islamic Army) in the context of the Indonesian National 
Revolution and the fight against Dutch colonial rule. As Quinton Temby (2010) notes, this latter 
split is in many ways a seedbed of contemporary militant offshoots in Indonesia especially groups 
like JI.  
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For the following paper, this specific social imaginary and contingent historical experience is 
important for explanatory purposes because often a recourse to violent militancy rests on questions 
of identity. Something that Colombijn and Lindblad’s (2002) key historical concept of ‘reservoirs 
of violence’ underscore in explaining conflict in Indonesia. In the struggle against the Dutch, 
groups had built up ‘reservoirs of violence’ (arms, training, repertoires, loyalties, supply routes 
and networks) at the same time as developing different ‘imagined decolonizations’. If we think 
about the violence after World War Two across Indonesia, it was often conflict over how to define 
postcolonial identities and in response to exclusionary injustices. That is to say certain group 
identities often forged and crystallized in opposition to emergence of the modern nation-state and 
its coercive/exclusionary practices. This fuelled certain demands for autonomy and sometimes 
precipitated violent action. Significantly, ‘reservoirs of violence’ can persist across time and, 
whilst not a direct causal catalyst of violence, they can pattern action when it arises. In fact, certain 
contemporary militant groups in Indonesia in some ways trace an insurgency connection and their 
‘repertoires of violence’ back to the formation, structures and imaginary of particular anti-colonial 
militias. 
 
To elaborate, the rise of Sukarno’s secular nationalism signaled major restrictions on radical 
Islamic movements in Indonesia and precipitated a host of unintended consequences. Sukarno 
banned DI and TII in the aftermath of independence but under the leadership of S.M. Kartosuwiryo 
(pak Imam), the Darul Islam secessionist rebellion and violent insurgency for the establishment of 
negara Islam Indonesia (NII - Indonesian Islamic State) continued in places such as West Java, 
South Sulawesi, Aceh and South Kalimantan from 1949 to 1962 (Formichi 2010). For NII, “Islam 
was the foundation and legal basis of the Islamic State of Indonesia, the Koran and tradition 
constituting the highest authorities.” (van Dijk 1980, 93) After a bloody campaign by the Indonesian 
military, Kartosuwiryo was eventually captured and executed in September 1962 (Dengel 1995). 
Nonetheless, Kartosuwiryo proclaiming himself imam of negara Islam Indonesia (NII - 
Indonesian Islamic State) on 7th August 1949 created a powerful alternative ‘imagined 
decolonization’; an alternate ‘myth of nationhood’. To use Benedict Anderson’s (1991) 
terminology, it constituted a different ‘imagined community’ in opposition to the Pancasila state 
envisioned by the secular nationalists. It should also be noted that many ulama especially from 
Nahdlatul Ulama opposed Kartosuwiryo’s vision and insurgency efforts.    
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As Temby contends Darul Islam is not so much a ‘movement’ as a community that perpetuates 
and reconstitutes itself by looking-back to Kartosuwiryo and who ‘imagine’ themselves as 
members of negara Islam Indonesia. That is they view themselves as a ‘nation’ contiguous with 
the state proclaimed by Kartosuwiryo in 1949. From the work of Anderson, this is the idea that 
people who perceive themselves as part of a ‘community’ ultimately imagine it. As such, in the 
Indonesia context, the ‘nation’ of Darul Islam is largely mobilized around a socio-political 
construct that rests upon a process of invention and reinvention of Kartosuwiryo’s legacy. 
Adopting this social imaginary framing sheds some interesting light on the the reproductive 
dynamics of contemporary militancy in Indonesia. If we view Indonesia’s contemporary Islamist 
militancy in significant respects as part of a wider reiterative process and pattern of violence 
associated with attempts to (re)constitute negara Islam Indonesia across space and time, it makes 
seemingly sporadic, periodic and episodic fluctuations in Islamist militancy more intelligible. 
Moreover, social movement theory brings some clarity to the enduring symbolic power and 
mobilizing potential of Kartosuwiryo’s legacy and the force of his alternative ‘imagined 
decolonization’. According to della Porta and Diani (1999, 62), “the more intense one’s 
socialization into a particular vison of the world, the stronger the impetus to act.”  
In the Indonesian context, although the militias and communities supporting the establishment of 
negara Islam Indonesia fell into disarray after Sukarno’s concerted military campaign, 
Kartosuwiryo’s idea, his legacy, the memories, ‘reservoirs of violence’ and loyalties of those times 
did not fade completely. In fact, they continue to provide powerful contextual narratives and 
ideational resources. As such, this constitutes the substance of perception for a temporally and 
spatially dislocated ‘imagined community’ of sporadic groupings to re-coalesce in militancy and 
action around a resiliently ‘powerful myth’ and ‘imagined’ objective.  
In other words, the formation and structures of militia’s that emerged in the context of the anti-
colonial struggle and mobilized to action by the idea of negara Islam Indonesia provide a 
touchstone and connection, no matter how tenuous, for several contemporary militant Islamist 
offshoot in Indonesia. The roots of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI - Islamic Community), Ring Banten, Abu 
Bakar Battalion, Abu Umar Network, and Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara (AMIN - 
Nusantara Islamic Jihad Forces) all trace a link and in some sense a nebulous feeling of loyalty, 
11 
 
kinship and belonging to the ‘imagined community’ of Darul Islam and negara Islam Indonesia. 
A bit like gravity, you can’t see it but it exerts a decisive pull nonetheless. 
 
Interacting Conditioning Factors  
Moving our analysis of conditioning factors forward, we can also see by the early 1970s a wider 
international context interacting with localized developments. The rising influence of Saudi 
Arabian and Gulf petro-dollars start to play a more significant role and strengthens ties through 
substantial aid and support for Muslim groups in Indonesia (Thayer 2008, 260-4). Alongside 
scholarships for dakwah activities promoting Wahhabist teachings, this largesse helps nurture and 
underpin the growth of a neo-fundamentalist Salafi movement both directly or indirectly. 
Moreover, the dissemination of radical teachings was facilitated in many instances by hadhrami 
(Indonesians of Middle Eastern descent) of which Abdullah Sungkar is a notable example 
(Abushouk and Ibrahim 2009, 1-15).  
In fact, even under the repressive grip of Suharto, subterranean allegiances to the idea of negara 
Islam Indonesia continued and the latent threat of militancy would occasionally flare. For instance, 
the activities of the relatively short-lived Komando Jihad (another offshoot of DI) in the 1970s and 
early 1980s posed a threat to Suharto’s New Order. As did the Imron Group who took inspiration 
from the 1979 Iranian revolution and were involved in the Bandung police post incident and the 
high-jacking of a Garuda DC-9 in 1981. Other flare ups included the Tanjung Priok massacre in 
1984, the bombing of Borobudur in 1985 and the Lampung incident in 1987 (McGlynn et al 2005).  
The interaction with a wider international context also plays a significant role when a coterie of 
combat hardened new arrivals and returnees who had fought with the mujahidin in Afghanistan in 
the late 1980s go on to provide influential tutelage to aspiring local militants and jihadists 
(Hartman 2013; Abbas 2011). For instance, Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi and Nasir Abbis trained 
alongside Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) members from the Philippines at Afghanistan 
Mujahidin Military Academy at Camp Saddah. This camp on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border was 
operated by Tanzim Ittihad-e-Islamy Afghanistan under the command of one Abu Sayyaf. On their 
return, the ties the likes of Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi and Nasir Abbas had made with MILF leaders 
and the Abu Sayyaf network in Mindanao, Philippines would be an important precursor to militant 
activities in Indonesia. Many aspiring local militants and jihadists also drew succor from their links 
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back to Pesantren Al-Mukmin (aka Pondok Ngruki) founded by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah 
Sungkar in 1972. It is well-documented that Hambali, al-Ghozi, Ali Imron, Amrozi, Huda bin 
Abdul Haq (Ali Gufron/Mukhlas) Joni Hedrawan (Idris) and Dulmatin all had connections to 
Pondok Ngruki. 
Given these manifold conditioning factors and the destabilizing events of the Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997, it is of little surprise that conducive conditions existed for Islamist extremism and 
paramilitary groups to prosper in the economic instability and political uncertainty of the 
immediate post-Suharto period (Bandoro 2001, 333-7; Gershman 2002, 60-74). The practice of 
turning of a blind eye or not following up investigations by sympathetic hardline ‘green’ factions 
in the National Police Force (POLRI) and Armed Forces (TNI) alongside endemic corruption also 
facilitated developments (Atkins 2004, 174; Bandoro, 2002, 234-6; Carnegie 2010, 90-1; Roosa 
2003, 10-11).  
 
Factions and Splinters  
Many militant Islamist groups in Indonesia are typically factional in character and retain some sort 
of direct or indirect link to larger hardline organizations (Carnegie 2009, 5). It is estimated 15 to 
20 percent of all Saudi charity dollars sent to Indonesia end up one way other in the hands of 
‘suspect’ groups (Bond 2005). Little or no accountability and the lack of discernible paper trails 
make tracing and then preventing the diversion of donations away from relief operations in to the 
hands of militants a hard ask. For instance, allegations abound about links between komite aksi 
penanggulangan akibat krisis (KOMPAK – Action Committee for Crisis Response) set up in 
Central Sulawesi in 1988 to help victims of flood, disaster and conflict and the indirect channeling 
of funds to militant groups (ICG 2004, 1-42).  
The following is in no way an exhaustive list but gives us some indication of the most visible 
groupings. For example, although nominally disbanded since 2002 after its involvement in inter-
communal violence in the Maluku and Papua, Laskar Jihad (LJ - Militia of the Holy War) was 
largely viewed as a militant offshoot emerging from links to Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah 
wal-Jama’ah (FKAWJ - Forum for Followers of the Sunna and the Community of the Prophet). 
Despite denials, suspicion persists that the erstwhile LJ also enjoyed indirect links with orthodox 
Islamic organizations, namely, Dewan dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII – Islamic Propagation 
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Council of Indonesia) and Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas dengan dunia Islam (KISDI – 
Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World). DDII and KISDI are both major 
promoters of ‘Islamization from below’ in Indonesia and active in propagating translated Muslim 
Brotherhood texts and Salafist ideas through pesantren, mosques and on university campuses. 
They receive substantial funding from the Middle East. And in the case of its militant activities in 
the Maluku, support and training from sympathetic “green” factions in the armed forces in 
particular Kopassus (Hasan 2002, 4-18). LJ always publicly denied any links with al-Qaeda and 
focused firmly on domestic concerns making a reemergence of its ‘repertoires violence’ not 
beyond the realms of possibility if the right set of domestic circumstances arose. Similar to a 
certain extent, Laskar Pembela Islam (LPI - Defenders of Islam Army) operates as the paramilitary 
wing of the hard-line vigilante organization Front Pembela Islam (FPI - Islamic Defenders Front) 
with very much a domestic issues focus and tacit support from certain sections of the military and 
police forces (ICG 2010, 17). Top ranking officials have all appeared at FPI events in Jakarta, 
something that sends a mixed message about official attitudes to FPI methods for maintaining so-
called ‘law and order’. Somewhat differently, Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahidin 
Militia) acts as an umbrella term for largely anti-statist mujahidin groups not associated with 
Laskar Jihad. These include Mujahidin KOMPAK, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI - 
Indonesian Mujahidin Assembly) and the now disbanded Sulawesi based Laskar Jundullah (Army 
of God or God’s Soldiers). Interestingly, when MMI, FPI and AMIN led renewed recruitment 
attempts in Aceh after the 2004 tsunami under the guise of providing humanitarian aid and dakwah, 
they met with little community support (ICG 2010a, 1-27). Other organizations with links to 
militant vigilante groups include Forum Umat Islam (FUI - the Islamic People’s Forum), Forum 
Komunikasi Muslim Indonesia (Forkami - the Indonesian Muslim Communication Forum), Hizb 
ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI - Party of Liberation - Indonesia) and Gerakan Islam Reformis (Garis - 
the Islamic Reformist Movement).  
 
Counter-Terrorism Policy and (Re)-coalescence   
As we can see militant Islamist groups across Indonesia are numerous and a pretty mixed bag. 
Given the myriad different groupings operating in Indonesia an overall assessment of the 
effectiveness of Indonesia’s Counter Terrorism Policy (CTP) remains difficult. Nonetheless, by 
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examining the effectiveness of Indonesia’s CTP in response to a key militant Islamist threat sheds 
light on the ways Indonesia has sought to balance punitive action with preventive persuasion. 
As mentioned, networks like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) are not new in Indonesia. JI, Ring Banten, Abu 
Bakar Battalion; Abu Umar Network, and Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara all trace links 
back to the Darul Islam movement. Yet, the threat posed by networks like JI only really entered 
public consciousness in the early 2000s on a rising tide of concern about new globally networked 
terrorism (Abuza 2005, 31-61). Established militant groupings like JI could feed into narrative 
discourses that allowed them to represent themselves as a regional franchise of al-Qaeda with links 
across Southeast Asia. JI was always much more than a mere propaganda vehicle for al-Qaeda. On 
a discursive level, by allying with a new set of pan-regional partners who envisioned darul Islam 
nusantara (an archipelagic Islamic state) JI was able to adopt a convenient piece of fear-inducing 
propaganda in the pursuit of its long held objective of negara Islam Indonesia. JI’s deeper roots 
and objectives in Indonesia facilitated its ability to conduct jihadist operations and meant it posed 
a very real security threat to the Indonesian authorities. For instance, the Christmas Eve bombings 
in 2000 in Medan, Northern Sumatra and Batam Island; the 2002 bombings in Bali and Sulawesi; 
the 2003 Jakarta JW Marriott Hotel bombing; the 2004 suicide bombings at the Australian 
Embassy in Jakarta and the 2005 Bali restaurant bombings all bore a substantial JI stamp. The 
Marriot and Ritz Carlton bombings in Jakarta in 2009 were also linked to the work of a JI splinter 
group, probably Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad formerly led by the now deceased Noordin M. Top 
(Carnegie 2013, 15).  
A major goal of Indonesia’s CTP has been diminishing and fragmenting this threat strategically. 
The success of which is closely aligned to the inroads made by Indonesia’s US/Australian backed 
elite counter-terrorism squad, Detasemen Khusus 88 (Special Detachment 88 -- more commonly 
known as Densus 88). Densus 88 formed in 2003 in the aftermath of the 2002 Bali bombings with 
economic aid incentives and logistical assistance from the US Department of State’s Anti-Terrorist 
Assistance program and from the Australian government. Along with the TNI and POLRI, they 
received large amounts of equipment, technical support and training to enhance the country’s 
threat reduction capacity. This even included the construction of multimillion-dollar training 
facility partly funded by Australia. In fact, the last decade has brought Indonesia and Australia (an 
important regional partner of the US) closer together in making inroads against a perceived 
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extremist threat. The Australian government also committed AUD$36.8million over 5 years in 
cooperation with the Indonesian government to establish the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement 
Cooperation (JCLEC) in 2004. Based at Indonesian National Police Academy (AKPOL) in 
Semarang, this bilateral initiative provides a joint police training program for combatting 
terrorism. 
 
The upshot being that Densus 88 has managed to cut a swathe through JI’s operational capacity 
over the last decade (Fealy 2004). It is responsible for the  incarceration  or  death  of  many  of  
JI’s  leading  figures and other Islamist militants (McDonald 2008). An estimated 700 militant 
suspects have been arrested and around another 60 killed by the squad. In fact, over the last decade, 
all the major suspects in the 2002 Bali bombing have either been imprisoned, executed or killed 
(Paramudatama 2012). For example, former terror mastermind Riduan Isamuddin (Hambali), a 
key link between JI and al-Qaeda is now languishing in Guantanmo Bay. In 2005, Densus 88 killed 
the Malaysian, Dr. Azahari bin Husin, one of the alleged technical masterminds behind the 2002 
Bali bombings. In 2008, the two brothers Huda bin Abdul Haq (Ali Gufron/Mukhlas), Ali Amrozi 
bin Haji Nurhasyim (Amrozi) along with Imam Samudra were executed by firing squad on the 
prison island of Nusa Kambangan for their role in the 2002 Bali Bombings. The same year saw 
the South Jakarta District Court rule that JI was an illegal organization. This public judicial 
unmasking of its activities brought JI out of the shadows. It severely dented JI’s ability to infiltrate 
communities and thrive as a tanzim siri (secret organization). In 2009 Densus 88 also killed 
Azahari’s close partner and ‘money man’ Noordin M. Top. Dulmatin (a leading member of JI) was 
shot in 2010. Furthermore the radical cleric and JI emir (spiritual head) Abu Bakar Ba’asyir 
received a 15 year sentence in 2011 for his attempts to set up and support jihadi training camps in 
Aceh. In the same year, Abu Umar and six alleged members of his group were arrested on 
suspicion of planning to bomb the Singapore embassy in Jakarta. In 2012, Umar ‘the demolition 
man’ Patek was also sentenced to 20 years in jail after his capture and extradition from Pakistan. 
 
Clearly, the shape, scope and character of Indonesia’s militant Islamist ‘terror-scape’ has been 
altered since the 2002 Bali Bombings. Shifts in leadership, the removal of key figures, ideological 
divisions, fragmentation and changing pathways to militancy have all played a part in re-
orientating the scheme of things. Nonetheless, despite the ‘hard tactic’ effectiveness of Densus 88 
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in degrading JI’s organizational and operational capacity investigation reveals that JI members 
have always been bound as much by kinship, marriage, schooling, training camps and mutual 
business relationships as by structured organizational fidelity.  
 
Operational diminution, fragmentation and loss of leadership does not mean JI has simply 
disappeared. It may have lost much of its coordinating leadership and strategic threat but its 
strength never wholly resided in a coherent organizational structure. Indeed, flux, mutation and 
realignment are as much a part of JI’s DNA matrix as fixed organisational structure and hierarchy. 
Differences in attitude and ideology also contribute to more centrifugal than centripetal tendencies. 
Something exacerbated by weak overall leadership (Hwang 2012, 1-12). Since the death of the 
charismatic Abdullah Sungkar in 1999, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir made for a relatively unconvincing 
figurehead having never really possessed the necessary strategic or coordination skills to be a 
major unifying force of Indonesia’s militant Islamists. This lack of collective solidarity is also  
related to the fact that while there may be broad agreement on the idea of an Islamist state in 
Indonesia (negara Islam Indonesia), thinking on the method and approach of achieving that goal 
vary widely especially in relation to the extent of violent and non-violent means. For instance, 
when Dulmatin (now deceased) returned from training in Mindanao he questioned the 
effectiveness of suicide bombing as an operational tactic and became a strong advocate of a more 
coordinated coalition between the activities of organizations (lintas tanzim) and longer-term 
strategic goals. The thinking being that fostering community support for their aims would help to 
establish secure bases across different regions. Part of which involved enforcing shari’a through 
jihad and promoting the ‘correct’ form of Islam by means of dakwah. These bases would then in 
turn act as focal points to further consolidate the radical Salafi jihadist insurgent message and 
project. This has brought about a shift from indiscriminate terror to more persistent insurgency.  
A renewed emphasis on study circles and pengajian (teaching in certain areas) led by clerics, some 
of whom promote non-violent dakwah (Islam propagation) others violent jihad has allowed JI and 
some of its more recent splinters like the Abu Bakar Ba’asyir inspired Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid 
(JAT - Partisans of the oneness of God) to gain purchase in areas with long histories of insurgency 
and localized intra-communal conflict. Parts of Indonesia and certain ‘imagined communities’ 
offer up deeply embedded narrative structures of meaning upon which militant Salafi jihadist 
discourses can provisionally engraft. The situation is complicated further by the adjacent long 
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running separatist conflict led by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Mindanao in the 
Southern Philippines. For instance, in 1996 Abdullah Sungkar through his close links with then 
MILF leader Salamat Hasyim moved JI’s main training to Mindanao and built Camp Hudaibiyah 
on land within MILF’s larger Camp Abu Bakar complex (Hartman 2013, 164-5). Although a 
tentative peace deal has been brokered in Mindanao recently, it is still a staging post for training 
camps and trafficking routes; a surrogate ‘reservoir of violence’ so to speak. This means that ideas, 
arms and personnel can still channel up and down from Mindanao, often facilitated by the MILF 
and the likes of the previously mentioned Abu Sayyaf network, through a chain of islands across 
the Celebes Sea and into places like Sulawesi and the Muluku.  
It would appear that the militant dynamics and reproductive fluctuations of the current period 
strongly reflect a combination of the Darul Islam thesis put forward by Temby and the work on 
the roots of violence in Indonesia by Colombijn and Linblad. In fact, it is probably more accurate 
to describe JI as a loose divergent network of groups. A composite ‘imagined community’ who 
draw on specific imaginings, structures of meaning and reservoirs of violence. These temporally 
and spatially dislocated sporadic militant groupings, each one made up of like-minded extremists, 
(re) coalesce around a resiliently ‘powerful myth’ and ‘imagined’ objective in opposition to the 
Indonesian Republic.  
As things stand today in Indonesia, a splintered jihadist community may appear limited in its 
ability to elicit broad-based popular support for its violent tactics but it still retains the ability to 
spread its extremist message especially amongst disaffected and impressionable youth who fall 
into the jihadist orbit. There are also multiple recruitment paths into radicalization and Islamist 
militancy whether it be spiritual, intellectual or kinship based. For instance, the dakwah activities 
of jihadist groups and hardline clerics can often gain an initial surreptitious access to young 
Indonesians through former links with the wide and complex network of pesantren (Islamic 
boarding schools) that traverse Indonesia. These secretive jihadist groups can then lure students 
into joining exclusive prayer groups or religious discussions outside campuses, an entry point for 
potential radicalization and militancy. Of course, stating this is not to implicate pesantren 
wholesale in the spread of a radical Islamist message as the vast majority of these institutions play 
vital socio-cultural, religious and educational roles in Indonesian society. In fact, given their 
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embeddedness in the social fabric of Indonesia, those pesantren with long established credentials 
are in many ways a bulwark against militancy. 
 
Getting Smart: Between Punitive Action and Preventive Persuasion 
Indonesia’s CTP may have made inroads in reducing the country’s militant and strategic terror 
threat but at the same time, the state agencies involved in its implementation have also been subject 
to some harsh criticism. This places increased pressure on an already friable rule of law. 
Accusations abound both domestically and internationally of human rights abuses. They usually 
concern the activities and operating procedures of Densus 88 and range from extra-judicial 
killings, arbitrary detentions and torture allegations to a worrying lack of transparency and 
accountability. In fact, methods used to degrade the terror threat may ‘blowback’ especially as 
groups fragment and switch tactics to more localized retaliatory responses. Prisons can also act as 
incubators for extremism by way of radicalization, training and recruitment (ICG 2007, 3-5).  
 
Countering militancy in Indonesia is far from straight forward. It is a divisive and complex issue. 
As mentioned, some worrying currents of religious intolerance are becoming evident in 
Indonesia (ICG 2010, 17, HRW 2013, 60-66). Radical organizations like Front Pembela Islam 
(FPI - Islamic Defenders Front) may be slowly realizing that politics and bombs do not mix but 
violent intimidation of so-called ‘heretics’ and ‘deviants’ by its associated ‘thugs’ or the local 
mobs they help incite continues largely unabated. There remains a reluctance on the part of 
authorities to curb their hate speech, incitement to violence, intimidation and training activities. 
Prosecutions do occur but they are all too infrequent and usually lenient. Badan Koordinasi 
Pengawas Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat (Bakor Pakem - Coordinating Board for Monitoring 
Mystical Beliefs in Society) further normalises and reinforces the acceptability of intolerant 
attitudes and practices through its influential role in recommending the banning of certain religious 
sects/groups to the Attorney General’s Office and its active pursuing of prosecutions for 
blasphemy (HRW 2013: 60-66; 71-86). Top ranking officials have also appeared at FPI events in 
Jakarta. This seems to send a mixed message about official attitudes towards FPI methods for 
maintaining so-called ‘law and order’ (HRW 2013, 19, 54, 72, 75-76). Having said this, FPI’s 
chairman and founder, Habib Muhammad Riziek Syihab did receive a 1.5 year jail term in 2008 
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for inciting attacks against a gathering held by the National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and 
Belief in Jakarta that injured seventy demonstrators. 
 
Clues to explaining the rationale and more ‘hands off’ dimensions of Indonesia’s response to the 
‘grey area’ between radicalism and outright terrorist activity lie in localized understandings of the 
issues. Indonesian authorities understand that resorting exclusively to a punitive ‘hard approach’ 
in dealing with radical militant Islamist groups may be counterproductive in the long run  
(Ramakrishna 2009). Culturally speaking, resorting to excessive callousness or coercion are not 
symbols of power in Indonesia; in fact, it is more likely to undermine one’s legitimacy as it is seen 
as disharmonious. Rather, community support and harmony is better served through displays of 
benevolence and magnanimity. This also fuses with a particularly important part of Islamic 
teaching in Indonesia: the acknowledgement of repentance (tobat). In short, tobat places an 
emphasis on allowing a person the right to change themselves while at the same time as there being 
an obligation on society to accept those changes. When terrorists repent, society then reciprocates 
by accepting the changed behaviour.  
 
Significantly, it is this notion of repentance that helps inform and shape many of the specifically 
localized approaches to dealing with the spectre of radicalism in Indonesia. In fact, the utility of 
military force diminishes disproportionately if its runs to o  h i gh  a  risk of s to k i n g  
co mmu ni t y u n r e s t .  H arsh treatment and indefinite incarceration alone can simply fuel 
frustration, resentment and the anger of inmates and by extension their immediate and extended 
families against towards the Indonesian state and wider society. Given the networked ties that bind 
members of the extremist community, persistent punitive dealings run an associative risk of 
perpetuating a ‘ghettoized’ sub-culture of hate and alienation towards the state and wider society.  
If we accept that group identities often forge and crystallize in opposition to the State and its 
coercive/exclusionary practices. And we understand that the periodic and episodic fluctuations of 
militancy in Indonesia are part of a wider reiterative process and pattern of violence associated 
with attempts to reconstitute negara Islam Indonesia across space and time. Then the more violent 
the State response, the more it risks merely perpetuating a ‘ghettoised’ sub-culture of hate and 
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alienation towards the State. And the more intense the socialization of that ghettoized vision of the 
world becomes, the stronger the impetus to act. 
Putting issues of under-resourcing and ad-hoc institutionalisation aside for a moment, Indonesia’s 
localised understanding of its own militant problem has brought about a ‘smart’ approach of 
disengagement and de-radicalisation rather than an exclusive reliance on a traditional ‘hard’ 
approach of tactical assaults, punishment and detention (Abuza 2009: 193-211; Oorjitham 2008; 
Teo 2007). Although not as successful as the one run in Singapore, the ‘soft’ approach angle 
involves breaking the nexus of radicalisation and militancy through persuasion and alternatives. 
Rather than polarizing i m p r i s o n e d  m i l i t a n t s  f u r t h e r  f r o m  w h a t  i s  a  moderate 
Islamic majority, the rationale goes that if you can get them to recognize the destructive 
consequences of their actions then there is the possibility of opening a path to a credible alternative 
or second chance. This allows an opportunity for them to rediscover a different Islamic meaning 
in their lives, a discursive one that does not include the destructive cycle of extreme thinking, 
mobilisation and violence (Carnegie 2013).   
Although critics complained of former-President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s overly tentative 
handling of these issues, there has been some success albeit limited to balance ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
approaches in dealing with its radical militant threat. Putting this approach into practice has 
included the organisation of prayer sessions by members of Densus 88 in conjunction with militant 
detainees as a sign of respect and opportunity to atone for past deeds. Former Densus 88 chief, 
Brigadier General Surya Dharma was a prime mover in promoting the idea of treating someone 
fairly and give them a second chance if they genuinely seek to repent (bertobat) Getting militants 
to turn away from violence and terrorism and reclaiming them for society is crucial for lasting 
containment. The thinking is that it is more effective in the long-term if you can convince 
imprisoned militants to renounce violence and sever previous ties rather than incarcerating them 
indefinitely (Carnegie 2013).  
There have also been efforts to encourage inmates to speak out about their experiences as a warning 
to others and using their influence over other inmates to cooperate with authorities. For instance, 
by publishing and taking about his experiences ex-JI commander Mohammed Nasir Bin Abbas 
(2011) provided counsel on how to ‘de-program’ extremist mind-sets especially amongst 
Indonesian youth. Ex-JI member Ali Imron (brother of Amrozi) also renounced his past mistakes 
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by publishing a book and tapes and publicly advocating against terrorism. He and others have 
worked closely with the authorities and different non-state actors (i.e. socio-religious 
organisations) in their de-radicalisation efforts with militant detainees. These initiatives have also 
run in conjunction with ad campaigns on the street and through the media promoting an anti-
jihadist message. The real goal in all of this is to give these people a ‘way-back’.  
 
Moreover, the Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT - National Counterterrorism 
Agency set up 5 years ago to coordinate Indonesia’s CTP) has also taken steps to establish a multi-
institutional de-radicalization program in co-operation with religious groups, clerics, NGOs, 
universities and schools. This co-operative initiative includes the two largest national Islamic 
organizations Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah along with the likes of Al-Hikam College, 
the Islamic State University of Surakarta and the Indonesian Institute of Sciences. BNPT also runs 
the newly constructed $144.2 million Indonesian Peace and Security Centre (IPSC) in Sentul, West 
Java; a de-radicalization and rehabilitation facility for some of Indonesia’s most hardened 
convicted terrorists. The ultimate goal is to get militants to turn away from violence and terrorism 
and reclaim them for society not just for the sake of security containment but also societal harmony 
(Carnegie 2013).  
 
Conclusion 
On balance, the indicators are of a diminished macro-threat environment and a more manageable 
strategic security situation in Indonesia but this risks sounding overly optimistic. It is probably 
fairer to say that far from being eradicated, the strategic threat has been contained and reduced to 
a significant degree. This is far from a wholesale endorsement of the ways Indonesia deals with 
violence and militant extremism. Transforming the attitudes and conditions that incubate 
intolerance and extreme thinking that can lead to a spill over into violent militancy may form a 
part of Indonesia’s approach, but there remains a fine line between too little interference and 
actually dealing with the problem.  
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Tackling effectively the ‘grey area’ between radicalism and outright terrorist activity is an 
ongoing challenge especially if a growing atmosphere of intolerance is allowed to go largely 
unchecked.  Given the complex and deeply rooted types of insecurity that endure in Indonesia and 
if we factor in lax money transfer regulations and porous, notoriously difficult to patrol borders, 
then conditions still exist that can incubate extreme thinking into more home-grown forms of 
violent militancy. Continued commitment to a nuanced response and management of security 
threats both strategic and human remains a priority in Indonesia if it is to yield meaningful 
containment.  
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